My six points on the real growth rates of "other services," in summary, are: (i) Maddison's employment data for China may double-count military personnel, lowering employment growth in "other services." (ii) Chinese employment data are highly problematic, with a likely bias towards an underestimate of employment growth in "other services." (iii)Comparative and transition economics suggest positive labor productivity growth in "other services" in an economy that moves out of planning, as underemployment turns into open unemployment. Exchanging currency in a Chinese bank in the mid1990s vs. the early 1980s does not confirm zero labor productivity growth. (iv) Maddison (1998, p. 151) justifies his assumption of zero labor productivity growth in "other services" in China with: "I have assumed, in line with the practice of many OECD countries, that there was no increase in [labor] productivity and used employment as an indicator of output." My data show labor productivity growth rates of "other services" in OECD countries to be slightly positive, which suggests the absence of such a general practice. The standard deviation across countries is large, with individual countries exhibiting rates well above zero, which suggests the possibility of significant, positive labor productivity growth in "other services" for China. Across OECD countries, labor productivity growth rates of "other services Maddison in his reply, first, addressing item (iv), says that in the OECD database which I use (the OECD services database with data on employment and value added) the labor inputs are not standardized or adjusted (in my reading, they are for some but not all countries), and that with better employment data, average labor productivity growth in "other services" in 9 countries (out of the 24 countries that were OECD countries in the period he covers) in the period 1973-90 was 0.06% per year, i.e., very close to zero.
2 This is similar to what I find for these 9 countries in the OECD database used in my article, and it confirms that the application of zero labor productivity growth in "other services" is Maddison's assumption rather than a general practice.
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I further doubt that the average of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S. in 1973-90 is an appropriate estimator for an economy in transition and at a much earlier development stage. The source that Maddison refers to, Ark (1996) , in the same table (p. 114) also provides data for 1950 (and 1960 and 1979) . In the earlier period 1950-73, at an earlier development stage, average labor productivity growth in "other services" in these 9 countries is 1.51% per year. The degree to which average labor productivity growth in "other services" of the 9 countries constitutes a good estimator of labor productivity growth in any single one of the 9 countries differs from country to country. Spain, the least developed country among the 9 (but not a transition economy), in 1950-73 experienced labor productivity growth in "other services" of 4.66% per year (Ark, 1996, p. 114) , just above China's official rate in the reform period 1978-95. 4 Maddison, second, in my reading says that the ILO employment data (in v) are unlikely to be consistently defined over time and across countries, and "there is also a problem in 2 Maddison's 0.06% (2006, Table 5 ) is for "non-productive services" (with a definition in note 5 of Ark, 1996 , p. 160); China's "nonproductive" (i.e., "other") services further include business and professional services, finance, insurance, and real estate (Maddison, 1998 , or Holz, 2006 . I am able to reconstruct Maddison's (2006, Table 5 ) values for each of the three sectors agriculture, industry, and producer & distributive services from his source (Ark, 1996, pp. 109-15) , for all countries, but not so for "other services," where I am able to reconstruct Maddison's values only for 6 countries and where my resulting average across the 9 countries is 0.19% per year (Ark, 1996, p. 114) , not 0.06% (Maddison's figure) . The OECD services database, used in my article, does not provide data covering the same time period for all countries; disregarding time period differences, the average for the 9 countries covered by Maddison is 0.23%.
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In the period 1973-90, Spain's labor productivity growth rate in "other services" was 1.35% per year (Maddison, 2006, Table 5 , "non-productive services," or Ark, 1996, p. 114 ), compared to the 9-country average of 0.19% (or 0.06% in Maddison's presentation). In both the first and second period, labor productivity growth in the primary sector in Spain is higher than in China in the reform period, and in the secondary sector and in the "productive" tertiary sector about two-thirds that of China (with the complication that "productive" vs. "nonproductive" services in Maddison, 2006 , or Ark, 1996 , are not compatible with China's classification, as mentioned in note 2). For China's values see my article (Holz, 2006) .
CH-response-to-Maddison-21March06.doc knowing whether the sectoral breakdowns used by the ILO and the UN are compatible" (p. 125). In a lengthy footnote 19 in my article I examine the implications of inconsistent measurement of employment data for the conclusions that I draw in the paper; only a very particular, systematic bias in growth rates across countries would possibly make a difference.
Maddison, third, suspects that the labor productivity growth rates of "other services" of Kazakhstan, Slovakia, and the Ukraine (or possibly all transition countries?) are "subject to much greater mismeasurement than China's" (p. 125). The three countries are outliers in the chart in my article (Figure 1, p. 101 ) and are not needed for my point (vi) to hold, namely that China's official labor productivity growth in "other services" is perfectly justified by the labor productivity growth patterns of other transition countries.
In his reply, Maddison makes numerous additional comments that, in my reading, are meant as a general justification for adjusting Chinese growth rates. 5 Reasons can be found to adjust China's 1978-95 growth rates upward as well as downward. I have discussed some, briefly, in Holz (2002 Holz ( , 2003 Holz ( , 2005 . 6 In my article examining Maddison's reform period growth estimates for China I have, beyond arguing/showing that the operational methods chosen by Maddison for making adjustments do not hold up to scrutiny, in my view also shown that the specific reasons advanced by Maddison (1998) to justify his adjustments are problematic.
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Two short items remain. First, at the end of the conclusions of my article, going beyond Maddison's adjustments to Chinese data, I write in one sentence that I subscribe to a substantial margin of error in China's official growth rates but not an aggregate systematic bias, and provide a subjective estimate of the margin of error. Maddison replies that I do so "without a shred of evidence." I omitted to refer to my earlier publication on Chinese statistics in the Review of Income and Wealth (Holz, 2004, pp. 402-5) .
Second, Maddison's (1998) real growth rates for industry are taken from calculations of Harry Wu in 1997, with an average annual rate of 8.56% between 1978 8.56% between and 1995 8.56% between . Wu (2002 revised this value upward to 9.85%; in my article, I argue/show that these estimates are not a reliable alternative to China's official data, and Maddison in his reply does not address my assessment of Wu's calculation method. Maddison (2006, p. 124) (2) of his list, to me, appears worthy of further examination. Item (3) seems to hinge on using his 1990 value as a benchmark, where my article questions his data. I don't question the use of PPP figures (his item 4), nor adjustments of national data for the sake of international comparability (item 1). In the latter instance, Maddison needs to apply the assumption of zero labor productivity growth in "other services" to all countries at all times and use the product method in agriculture and industry for all countries; a quick check for the U.S. since 1950 suggests this is not the case for Maddison's historical cross-country series available on his homepage. 6 Maddison (2006, p. 123) writes "Holz makes no reference to other studies which confirm my view that it is useful to test the validity of official statistics by careful and transparent construction of alternative measures." I share his view on testing, and in Holz (2003) examine a range of evidence presented in the literature that claims to show that official data on industrial value added and GDP are wrong (and find the evidence not compelling). 7 Maddison also quotes a passage in OECD (2000, pp. 16-17) as saying that Maddison's estimates constitute a lower bound and the official growth estimates an upper bound. He attributes this passage to two officials of China's National Bureau of Statistics. I wonder if this passage does not, in fact, refer to the early period (1950s) of the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, one of these two officials, as head of the national income accounts division, in the economic census 2005 oversaw an official 16.8% upward revision to China's original official nominal 2004 GDP and an upward revision of average annual real growth in 1993-2004 from 9.0% to 9.5% (with, in 1993, 1994, and 1995, a 0.5, 0.5, and 0.4 
